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Assuming an alternative corporate governance paradigm that puts employees in the fi rm’s govern-
ance structures, as well as understanding their objective functions, we investigate capital struc-
ture decisions in employee-governed fi rms. Examining corporate capital structure decisions in 12 
European countries, we provide strong empirical evidence of employees’ conservatism in capital 
structure choice. We fi nd that employee-governed fi rms operate with signifi cantly lower leverage 
and that employee-governed fi rms are signifi cantly less levered at the same amount of earnings 
volatility than fi rms governed by other stakeholders. We also fi nd evidence that employee-governed 
fi rms, at least in some countries, rely on internal resources to a larger extent. However, we did not 
fi nd evidence that employee-governed fi rms have to pledge more collateral to obtain debt fi nancing. 
In addition to this, we fi nd evidence that employee-governed fi rms choose debt of shorter maturity 
and, somewhat surprisingly, that employee-governed fi rms in some countries are faced with lower 
cost of debt compared to fi rms governed by other stakeholders and not higher cost of debt as ex-
pected because of credit rationing and limited borrowing capacity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The modern capital structure theory that was developed in the last 50 years of-
fers various avenues to explain corporate capital structure choice. In their semi-
nal paper, Modigliani – Miller (1958) identified taxes as the main driver for the 
use of debt financing. The following research tried to answer why the interest 
tax shield provided by debt does not lead firms to borrow as much as possible. 
Modigliani – Miller (1963) then suggested that firms maintain reserve borrow-
ing capacity and that the incremental tax advantage of debt declines as more 
debt is issued and the interest tax shield becomes less certain. Miller (1977) 
argues that the gain from leverage falls significantly if personal taxes are taken 
into account. DeAngelo – Masulis (1980) consider tax shields other than interest 
payments such as depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits. 
Others acknowledge bankruptcy costs and argue that optimal capital structure is 
defined by the trade-off between the value created by the interest tax shield and 
the value lost from bankruptcy costs. More recent literature focuses on agency 
costs and asymmetric information. Assuming that managers do not always act 
in the best interest of shareholders, the agency cost theory emphasises the role 
of debt as a disciplining device. By increasing the debt, shareholders reduce the 
free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986), but on the other hand, this causes the 
asset substitution problem (Jensen – Meckling 1976) and suboptimal invest-
ment (Myers 1977). Models based on asymmetric information hypothesise that 
capital structure choice can change the market’s perception and affect the firm’s 
value. Myers (1984) argues that the firm’s financing process follows a peck-
ing order, forcing the firm to exhaust internal resources first and when external 
resources are required, to first issue debt, while issuing equity capital only as a 
last resort. However, empirical evidence suggests that modern capital structure 
theory cannot sufficiently explain firms’ capital structure decisions. Empirical 
evidence shows that firms’ leverage is well beyond the levels suggested by the 
trade-off theory and that firms forgo significant tax benefits, and what is more, 
little of the variation in leverage is captured by other proposed determinates. 
Firms pursue very conservative financial policies and their debt ratios exhibit 
significant stability over time (Lemmon – Zender 2001). Moreover, the ma-
jority of variation is driven by unobserved firm specific time-invariant effect 
(Lemmon et al. 2008).
We argue that modern capital structure theory is unable to sufficiently explain 
firms’ capital structure choice because it is developed on the assumption that 
firms are governed by shareholders and follow the goal of maximising sharehold-
ers’ wealth. Assuming that firms are governed by shareholders could be an appro-
priate assumption for some of the firms, but the concept of value maximisation 
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definitely does not encompass all the corporate governance arrangements and the 
resulting goals of the firms. Just a glance at the corporate governance systems 
around the world suggests that there are stakeholders other than shareholders that 
significantly affect firms’ behaviour. In Germany, for example, the legal system 
is quite explicit that firms do not have the sole duty of pursuing the shareholders’ 
interests. A system of codetermination enables employees’ active participation in 
the firm’s decision-making process. Specific corporate governance arrangements 
can be found in other European countries, Japan, etc. Besides, the new theory 
of the firm identifies alternative sources of power within the firm. According 
to the property rights theory that provides the foundation of the modern capital 
structure theory, power stems from ownership of physical assets. Hence, the firm 
is nothing but a collection of physical assets. It is no surprise, then, that there is 
no room for stakeholders other than shareholders, i.e. the owners of the assets. 
In contrast, Rajan – Zingales (1998) argue that power stems from control over a 
critical resource and that the main mechanism to allocate power is access; that is, 
the ability to use or work with this critical resource. An agent that is given privi-
leged access to the resource receives no residual rights of control, but the oppor-
tunity to specialise his human capital to the resource and make himself valuable. 
Highlighting alternative sources of power, the new theory of the firm defines the 
firm in terms of unique assets, as well as in terms of people that have access to 
the critical resources. Thus, it brings stakeholders other than shareholders within 
the boundaries of the firm.
In this paper, we investigate corporate capital structure decisions, assuming 
an alternative corporate governance paradigm. We investigate capital structure 
decisions in an employee-governed firm. An employee-governed firm is a firm 
having employees in control or a firm that recognises employees’ interests. In 
employee-governed firms, employees either actively participate in the firm’s 
decision-making process or the stakeholders in control consider employees’ in-
terests in the firm’s decision-making process. Having employees in control or 
recognising their interest implies that a firm would not follow the goal of max-
imising the value of the firm. One would intuitively expect that employees are 
maximising wages and other benefits. Theoretically, we can derive employees’ 
objective function by paralleling their claim to the debtholders’ claim in the firm. 
Merton (1974) showed that the value of debt is equal to the difference between 
the value of the firm’s debt discounted at a risk-free rate and the value of the put 
option on the firm’s assets or to the payoff to debtholders when the firm is solvent 
and the debt repaid, and the expected recovery given bankruptcy, weighted by the 
probabilities of bankruptcy. Applying this logic to the employees’ claim, we find 
that the value of the employees’ claim is equal to the difference between the value 
of the wages the firm owes to employees discounted at the risk-free rate and the 
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value of the put option on the firm’s assets or to the payoff to employees when 
the firm is solvent and the expected recovery in bankruptcy weighted by the prob-
abilities of bankruptcy. Thus, employees’ aim is to maximise the value of their 
wages and to minimise the value of the put option on the firm’s assets. The put 
option value decreases with the value of the firm’s assets, and it increases with 
the volatility of the firm’s operating cash flow. However, as argued by Faleye et 
al. (2006), given that employees’ careers with the firm are finite, it is assumed 
that they have limited horizons and that they employ an infinite discount rate in 
the period beyond their careers. Under this assumption, the employees’ objective 
is to minimise the value of the put option. Employees are thus concerned with 
maximising wages, as well as being highly risk averse in their decisions in order 
to minimise the probability of bankruptcy.
Because an employee-governed firm maximises the wages and minimises 
the probability of bankruptcy, and it is not driven by shareholders’ aspirations 
of value maximisation, we hypothesise that the capital structure choice of an 
employee-governed firm is very conservative. An employee-governed firm is ex-
pected to operate with lower leverage compared to the firm that is governed by 
shareholders. Lower leverage results from lower demand for debt because inter-
est payments reduce cash flow, and thus wages, and because leverage increases 
bankruptcy risk. Besides, employee-governed firms are faced with a lower sup-
ply of debt due to credit rationing and the firm’s limited borrowing capacity. It 
is expected that it would opt for a debt of shorter maturity and would be faced 
with a higher cost of debt. Shorter debt maturity is expected because employee-
governed firms mitigate the problem of adverse selection and the resulting credit 
rationing by signalling its quality to uninformed lenders by borrowing short term 
instead of long term (Flannery 1986; Diamond 1991). Higher cost of debt in 
employee-governed firms is expected because financial markets disfavour demo-
cratic firms (Gintis 1989).
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section we hypothesise about 
capital structure decisions in an employee-governed firm, we discuss the demand 
and supply of debt, as well as the choice of debt maturity and the cost of debt 
faced by an employee-governed firm. In the third section, we present the data and 
in the fourth, the methodology used in the empirical study. In the fifth section, we 
present the results. The sixth section concludes.
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2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS IN EMPLOYEE-GOVERNED FIRMS
2.1. Demand for debt
Intuitively, one would expect that an employee-governed firm that is maximising 
wages and minimising the probability of bankruptcy opts for the lowest possible 
level of debt because interest payments reduce cash flow, and thus wages, and be-
cause leverage increases bankruptcy risk. Lower demand for debt is not expected 
only in firms that are governed by employees, but also in firms that are governed 
by other stakeholders but are recognising employees’ interests. Chang (1992) de-
rived the firm’s optimal debt level in a shareholder-governed firm accounting for 
nonmonetary restructuring related costs borne by employees. He identified opti-
mal capital structure by investigating firms’ restructuring decisions and deriving 
an optimal contract between shareholders and employees, which includes capital 
structure choice. Because employees have no incentive to restructure, debt is used 
to implement the first-best restructuring rule. If the expected output exceeds the 
debt payment, debt can be rolled over and restructuring will not occur; otherwise, 
the firm is forced to restructure because of the potential loss of control. He showed 
that an ex ante optimal level of debt that balances financial as well as nonfinancial 
benefits of restructuring is generally below the level that maximises the value of 
the firm if the restructuring-related costs to employees are accounted for.
In a similar manner, capital structure implications were investigated by Berk 
et al. (2007), who examined capital structure choice as part of an optimal em-
ployment contract. Their optimal employment contract guarantees employees job 
security, unless the firm is in financial distress, and pays a fixed wage that rises 
when employees are more productive than expected. This is why employees be-
come entrenched. However, if the firm cannot make the interest payments at the 
contracted wage level, employees experience a temporary pay cut. If the firm’s 
performance improves, wages return to the contracted level, and if it worsens fur-
ther, the firm is forced into bankruptcy. Because entrenched employees are being 
paid more than the value they create, shareholders benefit from filing bankruptcy 
and normally have no incentive to avoid bankruptcy. Employees are terminated or 
replaced with more productive ones. As a result, entrenched employees face sub-
stantial bankruptcy costs such as taking a wage cut and earning the current market 
wage. The implications for optimal leverage occur ex ante because the amount of 
risk sharing between shareholders and employees depends on the leverage of the 
firm. Higher leverage implies a higher probability of bankruptcy and thus lower 
risk sharing. An optimal capital structure thus trades the benefits of risk sharing 
against the benefits of debt, such as tax shields, for example. Berk et al. (2007) 
argue that firms issue only modest levels of debt, and will also maintain cash 
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balances despite these being associated with tax disadvantages. A firm’s capital 
structure decisions are thus affected by the firm’s idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Namely, firms with more risk-averse employees will operate with lower leverage. 
Because such firms attract other more risk-averse employees, they argue that the 
effect is self-enforcing. Heterogeneity in risk aversion in the labour market thus 
results in a clientele effect, implying a persistent heterogeneity in capital structure 
choices among otherwise identical firms.
The effects of human costs associated with bankruptcy in capital structure de-
cisions have also been empirically examined. Chemmanur et al. (2009) tested 
whether firms with higher leverage pay their employees more and whether the 
resulting additional costs are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits 
of debt. They found that leverage has a positive impact on average employee pay 
and that the additional total labour expenses associated with an increase in lever-
age are large enough to offset all the incremental tax benefits. The evidence thus 
suggests that the incremental labour costs associated with an increase in lever-
age are substantial enough to limit the use of debt. They also found that leverage 
positively affects the magnitude of CEO compensation. Finally, they tested the 
importance of employees’ entrenchment. Examining old vs. new economy firms, 
associated with more and less entrenched employees and managers, they docu-
mented significant differences in the effect of leverage on average employee pay 
and CEO compensation. They found a positive impact of leverage on average 
employee pay only in old economy firms. Similarly, the impact of leverage on 
CEO compensation proves to be significant only in old firms, whereas leverage 
in new economy firms tends to affect only the cash pay of the CEO.
2.2. Supply of debt
Credit market equilibrium is characterised by credit rationing. Following the im-
petus of Jaffe – Russell (1976), Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz – Weiss (1981, 1983), 
economists have come to the conclusion that credit rationing is driven by the 
asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, adverse selection, and 
the moral hazard problem. Lenders and borrowers have asymmetric information 
about the quality of the borrowers. When lenders cannot separate good borrow-
ers from bad borrowers, bad borrowers are more likely to be selected than good 
borrowers. A higher interest rate tends to attract bad borrowers because good bor-
rowers are willing to pay only a low interest rate and are thus driven out of the 
market. Lenders therefore want to keep interest rates low in order to attract good 
borrowers. As a result, some of the borrowers that want credit cannot obtain it. 
Moral hazard problem refers to the problem of inducing the borrower to behave 
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as desired by the lender when the borrower’s actions cannot be observed and 
contracted for. Because of the interest rate’s incentive effects, the behaviour of the 
borrower is likely to change with the increase in the interest rate. A higher inter-
est rate decreases the borrower’s return on projects that succeed and thus induces 
them to undertake riskier projects. For this reason, lenders again want to keep 
interest rates low in order to attract good borrowers and, as a result, some borrow-
ers are unable to obtain credit, whereas the borrowers that do obtain credit may be 
faced with limited borrowing capacity.
Firms mitigate the adverse selection problem and credit rationing by sig-
nalling the true quality to uninformed lenders; they invest their own funds in 
projects (Leland – Pyle 1977), pledge collateral (Chan – Kanatas 1985; Bester 
1985, 1987; Besanko – Thakor 1987), borrow rather short-term than long-term 
and secure fewer resources than needed in the future and thus convey to unin-
formed lenders the confidence about their prospects and that they are not afraid 
of refinancing short-term debt (Flannery 1986; Diamond 1991), and choose an 
appropriate payout policy (Miller – Modigliani 1961; Bhattacharya 1979; Miller 
– Rock 1985; John – Williams 1985; Bernheim – Wantz 1985). Firms mitigate 
the moral hazard problem and increase their borrowing capacity by pledging real 
assets as collateral (Bester 1987), by building reputation capital, and by diversi-
fication (Diamond 1989), as well as by bringing down the bargaining power of 
human capital (Hart – Moore 1994).
We expect that the problem of credit rationing and limited borrowing capacity 
is more severe in an employee-governed firm compared to the problem in a firm 
that is governed by shareholders. Employees have limited personal wealth and 
are more risk averse compared to shareholders, and they also disfavour large pay-
outs, that is why an employee-governed firm is deprived of using the signalling 
mechanisms to convey its quality to uninformed lenders, and to mitigate lenders’ 
informational disadvantage and the adverse selection problem. Limited personal 
wealth and risk aversion as well as the bargaining power of human capital make it 
difficult to control the moral hazard problem. This results in lower supply of debt 
to employee-governed firms. Being left with the only possibility to signal the 
quality to uninformed lenders by borrowing short term and pledging collateral, 
we expect an employee-governed firm to opt for a debt of shorter maturity as well 
as to be forced to pledge more collateral to obtain debt financing. In addition, it 
is believed that financial markets disfavour democratic firms (Gintis 1989). That 
is why it is expected that an employee-governed firm, besides being faced with 
a lower supply of debt, will be faced also with a higher cost of debt compared 
to a firm that is governed by shareholders. Rather than lending to employee-
governed firms, lenders prefer to lend to firms governed by shareholders, which 
better protect their investments by enforcing value-maximising decisions.
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3. DATA
3.1. Database and samples
We empirically examined capital structure decisions in large firms from 12 Euro-
pean countries: four Western European countries (France, Germany, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom), five Central and Eastern European countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and the three Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).1 The choice of the countries is intended to cover 
the various legal environments in Europe. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that 
differences in the development of the financial system and thus the use of external 
resources stem from the differences in investor protection. They provide evidence 
that legal rules and the quality of law enforcement on investor protection vary 
systematically by legal origin. Legal origin can be English, French, German, or 
Scandinavian. English law is common law, whereas French, German, and Scan-
dinavian laws are part of the civil law tradition. Common law protects investors 
more than civil law. Within the civil law tradition, investors are better protected by 
German and Scandinavian law than by French law. Central and Eastern European 
countries’ and the Baltic states’ (CEB) current legal systems are based on German 
civil law. Despite scoring higher than the other civil law families on legal rules, 
they are relatively less protective in terms of law enforcement (Pistor et al. 2000).
The data are from the AMADEUS database of Bureau van Dijk.2 Although 
data were collected for an eleven-year period, the panels cover only a seven-
year period, i.e., the period from 2001 to 2007. This is due to the fact that for 
some explanatory variables, data from the four preceding years are required. The 
panels consist of a relatively large number of observations; however, when the 
variables of interest are calculated, it drops significantly. For the corresponding 
period there are 19,088 observations available in France, 5,626 observations in 
Germany, 4,559 observations in Sweden, 7,521 observations in the UK and 9,551 
observations in CEB.3 Due to the poor quality of the data, unbalanced panels are 
considered. For example, in Sweden, which has the highest percentage of firms 
1  We restrict the analysis to firms with more than 250 employees and as it is typical for capital 
structure research, we exclude financial firms.
2  AMADEUS is a comprehensive pan-European database containing financial information on 
over 10 million public and private companies in 38 European countries. It includes data about 
24 balance sheet items and 25 profit and loss account items as well as some general descriptive 
information such as the firm’s legal form, year of incorporation, industry code, and number of 
employees. Moreover, unlike other pan-European sources, it includes ownership information.
3  In addition, outliers are excluded. We excluded the lowest and the highest percentile of obser-
vations according to the variables used in our regression models.
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represented in every year of the period under investigation, less than half of the 
firms could be used if balanced panels are used. The percentage amounts to less 
than 30 percent in other countries.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows that in our sample the average firm in France, Sweden, and the 
UK is roughly of the same size, while we observe a larger average firm size in 
Germany and a smaller average firm size in CEB. The average firm in France, 
Sweden, and the UK generated between 200 and 300 million EUR of sales, while 
the average German firm slightly more than 500 million EUR, whereas the aver-
age CEB firm less than 100 million EUR of sales. The average firm in France, 
Sweden, and the UK employed around 1,500 employees, while the average Ger-
man firm employed more than 2,000 employees and the average CEB firm less 
than 1,000 employees. In all countries, the median value of sales, total assets, and 
number of employees is well below the mean value, suggesting that most of the 
firms are smaller than the mean firm.
The existing literature on cross-country capital structure research shows that 
firms’ leverage differs on average across countries. As found by Rajan – Zingales 
(1995), the average firm in Germany has lower total debt ratio than the average 
firm in France, but in contrast to their findings, relatively higher leverage is ob-
served in the UK firms. The mean (median) value of total debt ratio amounts to 
48.7 percent (46.6 percent) in Germany, 54.9 percent (54.8 percent) in France, 
and 61.3 percent (62.2 percent) in the UK. Similar leverage to the leverage in 
Germany is observed in Sweden, 45 percent (40.9 percent). CEB firms operate 
on average with relatively high leverage 58.3 percent (60.6 percent). On the other 
hand, analysing long-term debt ratio, we surprisingly observe the highest lever-
age in CEB, followed by firms in the UK, Germany, and Sweden. In all countries, 
the median long-term debt is well below the mean value. Surprisingly, low long-
term debt ratio is observed in France.
The next thing that has an important implication for our study concerns the ev-
olution of leverage. Despite the fact that average leverage is fairly similar across 
years, there are significant differences among groups of firms that pursue differ-
ent financing policies. We constructed three groups of firms based on their total 
debt ratio in 1998, defined as firms with low, medium and high total debt ratio, 
and computed the average total debt ratio in all subsequent 9 years, holding the 
composition of the groups constant.4 The groups were defined using 25th and 75th 
4  For Germany, we constructed the groups in 2001 and analyse the evolution of leverage in the 
subsequent 6 years because of the low number of firms available in the period 1998–2000.
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percentiles as boundaries between the groups. The results can be seen in Figure 
1. Consistent with the findings of Lemmon et al. (2008), we observe significant 
differences in leverage between the groups. Although one can observe some con-
vergence among the leverage of the groups over time, the difference among the 
groups remains highly statistically significant.
Figure 1. Evolution of leverage
Notes: The panels show evolution of leverage in 10-year period of three groups of firms based on their total debt 
ratio in year 1998 (firms with low, medium and high total debt ratio). The evolution of leverage in Germany is 
shown only in a 6-year period due to the small number of firms available in the whole studied period.
Source: AMADEUS and authors’ own calculations.
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As already pointed out by Lemmon et al. (2008), the differences in the lever-
age of different groups of firms may be simply capturing cross-sectional varia-
tion in the underlying capital structure determinants identified by modern capital 
structure theory, such as profitability, tax status, bankruptcy cost, agency cost, 
and asymmetric information. For example, if profitability tends to be negatively 
correlated to leverage, firms included in the group with low leverage may simply 
be more profitable firms. We address this issue and based on the results it is not 
possible to conclude that the differences in leverage correspond to cross-sectional 
variation in profitability, tangibility of assets, or firm size.
Based on the results obtained here, it can be argued that capital structure deci-
sions are driven by a factor with a significant permanent component. Because 
capital structure decisions are significantly affected by corporate governance is-
sues, such as who governs the firm and what the objective function of the stake-
holder in control is, we argue that this is one possible direction to look for a firm-
specific time-invariant component.
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1. Leverage measures and explanatory variables
A firm’s leverage (LEV) is measured using two different ratios: long-term debt 
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to the value of total capital, 
i.e. equity capital and long-term debt, and total debt ratio that takes into account 
long-term debt and short-term debt. Even though only long-term debt represents 
long-term financing resources that are considered in capital structure decisions 
and we are interested primarily in the use of long-term debt, we have to rely on 
total debt in some countries because the data about the long-term debt does not 
look reliable.5 Leverage is measured only in book values because the samples 
mostly consist of unlisted firms. Debt maturity (MAT) is approximated by the 
ratio of long-term debt to total debt, and cost of debt (COST) by the ratio of in-
terests paid to total debt.
Employees’ ability to affect capital structure decisions stems from at least 
three different sources. Employees can affect capital structure decisions if they 
have ownership rights in the firm. However, employees can govern the firm or 
affect a firm’s decision-making process also without owning the firm. As already 
mentioned, in Germany, for example, a system of codetermination allows ac-
5  As seen in Table 1, we observe very low average ratio of long-term debt in France, very low 
median long-term debt ratio in Sweden, and relatively high long-term debt ratio in CEB.
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tive participation of employees in the firm’s decision-making process through 
workers’ councils and employee and union representation on supervisory boards. 
Therefore, the more the corporate governance system recognises employees’ in-
terest, the more employees’ participation in decision-making is expected. Finally, 
employees’ ability to affect capital structure decisions depends on the ownership 
structure and the effectiveness of monitoring by the shareholders.
Employees’ ownership rights cannot be uniquely determined within the 
AMADEUS because it does not distinguish employee-owned and manager-
owned firms, and reports them together. That is why we did not include employ-
ees’ ownership rights in our models. We could have tried analysing the effect 
together with manager-owned firms, however, because of conflicting hypotheses 
about the effect of employees’ ownership and managers’ ownership on leverage, 
it would not be possible to isolate the effect of employees’ ownership. As argued 
by Jensen – Meckling (1976), the higher the managerial ownership, the more 
powerful the incentives to make value-maximising decisions and the higher the 
leverage of the firm. Focusing on managerial control motivations, Haris – Raviv 
(1988) and Stulz (1988) argue that managers use debt to increase their voting 
power, whereas Israel (1991) argues that this is to affect the distribution of cash 
flows between voting and nonvoting shares in order to influence the outcome of 
the takeover contest. On the other hand, as argued by Faleye et al. (2006), firms 
in which labour has ownership stakes choose more conservative capital structures 
than value maximising firms that are owned by shareholders.
The extent to which employees’ interests are recognised and their ability to 
participate in decision-making result from employees’ entrenchment. Employees’ 
entrenchment allows employees to extract rents through wages and other ben-
efits. Following Črnigoj – Mramor (2009), employees’ entrenchment and rent ex-
traction are measured by their ability to increase wages relatively to the increase 
of value added. In particular, it is approximated by the difference between the 
growth rate of labour costs per employee and the growth rate of value added per 
employee (DIFF). Because employees’ entrenchment and their ability to affect 
decision-making within the firm are rather constant or could change only over a 
longer period of time, we calculated the growth rates over the whole period for 
which we have data available, i.e. as the growth rate between the first and the 
last year the firm has corresponding data available. The higher the difference, the 
more entrenched the employees, the lower the leverage. As argued by Flannery 
(1986) and Diamond (1991), by borrowing short-term instead of long-term and 
by securing fewer resources than needed in the future, firms signal their credit-
worthiness. An employee-governed firm which is deprived of using signals, such 
as investing their own funds in the firm, pledging collateral, and payout policy, 
can only signal its creditworthiness by borrowing short-term. It is thus expected 
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that an employee-governed firm opts for debt of shorter maturity compared to 
firms governed by shareholders. Because financial markets tend to disfavour 
democratic firms (Gintis 1989), it is also expected that employee-governed firms 
will be faced with a higher cost of debt.
Finally, employees’ impact on leverage decisions depends on the ownership 
structure and the effectiveness of monitoring by the shareholders. It is expected 
that the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the incentives to moni-
tor and the enforcement of value-maximising decisions by the shareholders. As 
argued by Jensen (1986), debt is one of the disciplining mechanisms. Thus, the 
higher the ownership concentration, the higher the leverage. Ownership concen-
tration should also result in longer debt maturity and lower cost of debt. Owner-
ship concentration and the effectiveness of monitoring is approximated by the 
ownership share of the largest shareholder (OWNCON).
Modern capital structure theory, that was primarily derived for firms in the 
developed economies, but, as argued by Hernádi – Ormos (2012a, b), can also 
be used to explain financial decisions in Central and Eastern European countries, 
suggests that a firm’s leverage is driven by factors such as profitability, tangibility 
of assets, firm size, and so on. That is why a set of control variables is used. Try-
ing to take into account the factors that exert the most significant effect on capital 
structure decisions as well as the limitation of data availability in the AMADEUS 
database, five factors are considered. These are profitability, tangibility of assets, 
earnings volatility, firm size, and firm growth.
In the literature, positive as well as negative effect of profitability can be found. 
According to the pecking order hypothesis (Myers 1984), leverage tends to be 
negatively correlated to profitability. Profitability can also proxy for growth op-
portunities and again have a negative impact on leverage. Myers (1977) viewed 
part of the corporate assets, particularly growth opportunities such as call options, 
whose value depends on discretionary future investments, and showed that by 
issuing risky debt, a firm reduces its value by inducing a suboptimal investment 
strategy or by forcing the firm and its debt holders to bear the costs of avoiding 
the suboptimal strategy. In contrast, the trade-off theory suggests that profitability 
is positively associated with leverage. More profitable firms have a larger in-
come to shield and operate with higher leverage compared to less profitable firms 
(Modigliani – Miller 1958, 1963).
Tangibility of assets is expected to have a positive impact on leverage. By 
pledging tangible assets as collateral, firms decrease the bankruptcy cost. Myers 
– Majluf (1984) also suggest that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured 
debt because firms securing debt by collateral with known values avoid the costs 
associated with underpricing resulting from asymmetric information. Jensen – 
Meckling (1976) argue that if debt is collateralised, the borrower is restricted 
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to using the funds for the specified project, whereas Myers (1977) expects that 
funds are used to pursue a more optimal investment policy. This means a lower 
free cash flow and lower debt overhang problem.
Firms with more volatile earnings are expected to operate with lower leverage. 
Firms with more volatile earnings have a higher bankruptcy cost and thus accord-
ing to the trade-off theory, a lower optimal capital structure.
The effect of firm size is again ambiguous. Warner (1977) found that direct 
bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger proportion of firm value as the firm 
size decreases. Opler – Titman (1994) also stressed the importance of the indirect 
costs of bankruptcy. They found that highly levered firms lose a substantial mar-
ket share to their less levered competitors, as well as market value of equity, in 
downturns. Larger firms tend to be also more diversified and thus less prone to go 
bankrupt (Titman – Wessels 1988). However, size can also proxy for information 
asymmetry and thus difficulties in tapping the equity market. Therefore, follow-
ing Scott (1977), who showed that small firms tend to be faced with a higher cost 
of issuing equity compared to larger firms, it is expected that small firms will 
operate with higher leverage.
Faster-growing firms, on the one hand, need more resources and taking into 
account pecking order considerations to accumulate higher debt levels. However, 
on the other hand, firm growth can also proxy for growth opportunities that re-
sult in higher information asymmetry. Then a negative impact is expected. As 
suggested by Jensen – Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), shareholders tend to 
expropriate wealth from bondholders by investing in suboptimal fashion. There-
fore, higher agency costs, which are also associated with growth opportunities, 
again mean lower leverage.
Profitability (ROA) is approximated by the return on assets, calculated as the 
ratio of the firm’s earnings before interests and taxes to the average value of total 
assets. Asset tangibility (TANG) is approximated by the ratio of the value of fixed 
assets to the value of total assets. Earnings volatility (SDROA) is approximated 
by the standard deviation of ROA, calculated from a three-year period. Firm size 
(SIZE) is approximated by the logarithm of sales. Firm growth (GS) is approxi-
mated by the growth rate of sales.
Being aware of persistent differences in the firms’ leverage across industries, 
industry-specific effects are taken into account. To cover the 15 industries de-
fined by sections in NACE Rev 1.1. industries, 14 dummy variables are included 
(one industry is treated as a base category).
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4.2. Regression models and estimation techniques
We first analyse the differences in leverage in employee-governed firms and the 
firms governed by other stakeholders. We estimated the following regression 
model:
               1 2 3,i it j it itLEV DIFF OWNCON CONTROLSα β β β ε      (1)
in which:
LEV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . long-term/total debt ratio;
DIFF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .employees’ entrenchment; and
OWNCON  . . . . . . . . . . . . .ownership concentration.
CONTROLS include:
ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . return on assets;
TANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .asset tangibility;
SDROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .earnings volatility;
SIZE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . firm size;
GS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . firm growth; and
industry dummies. 
Because of the specific demand for debt of employee-governed firms and the 
supply of debt to these firms it is also expected that employee-governed firms 
rely on internal resources to a larger extent, have to pledge more collateral, and 
are less levered at the same amount of earnings volatility compared to the firms 
governed by other stakeholders. Therefore, a dummy variable, which takes a val-
ue of 1 if the firm is employee-governed and 0 otherwise (DDIFF), instead of DIFF, 
as well as the corresponding interactive terms are used to test for the different im-
pacts through these capital structure determinants.6 To test for these differences, 
we estimated the following regression model:
       1 2 3 4
5 6,
DIFF i it DIFF i it DIFF i it
DIFF i it j it it
LEV D OWNCON D ROA D TANG
D SDROA CONTROLS
α β β β β
β β ε
    
  
. (2)
6  The dummy variable indicating ‘employee-governed’ is defined using DIFF, the 75th percen-
tile being the boundary separating the value 1 from 0. Interactive terms are defined by multi-
plying a DDIFF by ROA, TANG, and SDROA.
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To analyse the differences in debt maturity (MAT) in employee-governed firms 
and the firms governed by other stakeholders, we estimated the following regres-
sion model:
             1 2 3,i it j it itMAT DIFF OWNCON CONTROLSα β β β ε     . (3)
To see if employee-governed firms are faced with higher cost of debt (DEBT) 
compared to the firms governed by other stakeholders, we estimated the follow-
ing regression model:
             1 2 3,i it j it itCOST DIFF OWNCON CONTROLSα β β β ε     . (4)
The debt maturity regression model includes the same explanatory variables as 
the leverage regression model, while the cost of debt regression model includes in 
addition the leverage of the firm.
The parameters of the regression models were first estimated as pooled re-
gression using the OLS estimator, and then by the Hausman–Taylor estimator 
(HT) and the between-group estimator (BE). We cannot rely on the fixed-effect 
and random-effect estimates, as the former sweeps out time-invariant explanatory 
variables (employees’ entrenchment), while the latter is rejected by the Hausman 
test. The HT estimator, on the one hand, overcomes the problem of the random ef-
fect estimator that requires unobserved individual effects to be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, and on the other hand, it accommodates the possibility 
to include variables that are time-invariant. The BE estimator estimates the pa-
rameters of the model using group means variability. This again allows us to use 
variables that are time-invariant, though losing within-group variability.
5. RESULTS
5.1. The fi rm’s leverage
The regression results support the hypothesis that employee-governed firms op-
erate with lower leverage compared to the firms governed by other stakeholders. 
As seen in Table 2, the results show that a firm’s leverage is negatively correlated 
to employees’ entrenchment, approximated by their ability to extract rents, in 
particular by the difference between the growth rate of labour costs per employee 
and the growth rate of value added per employee (DIFF), in Germany, the UK, 
and CEB. The HT estimate of the coefficient amounts to –0.142 in Germany and 
even higher in the UK (–0.302) and CEB (–0.314 if leverage is approximated by 
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long-term debt ratio and –0.235 if leverage is approximated by total debt ratio).7 
A weak evidence of negative effect is observed also in France, while the coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant in Sweden. Due to the doubts in the reliability 
of the data on long-term debt ratio in France and Sweden, we did not use long-
term debt ratio as the dependent variable and we relied on total debt ratio in these 
countries. That is why the insignificant coefficient in France and Sweden, where 
total debt is used as the dependent variable, is not surprising, because we expect 
that employee-governed firms avoid using long-term debt, but not short-term 
debt. Employee-governed firms are deprived of using signals such as investing 
their own funds in the firm, pledging collateral, and payout policy, and can signal 
their creditworthiness only by borrowing short-term in order to mitigate the ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problem, and the resulting credit rationing and 
limited borrowing capacity.
In line with the hypothesis that employee-governed firms operate with lower 
leverage, we observe also that ownership concentration and the effectiveness 
of monitoring, approximated by the ownership share of the largest shareholder 
(OWNCON), positively affect firm’s leverage. This suggests that only large share-
holders are powerful enough to force the firms to increase the use of debt and thus 
activate this disciplining mechanism to align the interests of the stakeholders in 
control with their own interests.
In addition, employees’ conservatism in capital structure decisions is con-
firmed by observing that employee-governed firms are less levered at the same 
amount of earnings volatility than firms governed by other stakeholders; how-
ever, the coefficient is statistically significant only in some countries. We observe 
a statistically significant negative OLS and BE estimate of the interactive term 
DDIFFSDROA in Germany and CEB, but not in the UK (Table 3). Besides, we 
observe weak evidence that employee-governed firms to a larger extent rely on 
internal resources. Statistically significant negative coefficients for the interac-
tive term DDIFFROA were found only in France and Sweden. On the other hand, 
it would be difficult to argue that employee-governed firms have to pledge more 
collateral when issuing debt than firms governed by other stakeholders.
Going back to Table 2 and analysing the effects of the most widely tested capi-
tal structure determinants, one can find that in line with the pecking order hypoth-
esis, leverage is negatively correlated to profitability across all countries (ROA). 
This is observed in all four Western European countries and eight European tran-
sition economies (CEB). Similar findings for CEB countries were obtained by 
7  Being aware that short-term debt is often used as a long-term financing resource in CEB 
(because of being refinanced and rolled over at the maturity), we estimated the model in CEB 
using both measures for leverage: long-term debt ratio and total debt ratio.
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Hernádi – Ormos (2012a, b) for Central and Eastern European countries. This 
suggests that firms in these countries rely on internal resources and increase lev-
erage only when internal resources are exhausted. However, profitability can also 
proxy for growth opportunities. Negative correlation then implies difficulties in 
borrowing against growth options.
As found by previous studies, long-term debt is positively correlated to tangi-
bility of assets (TANG). When total debt is taken into account (France and Swe-
den), a negative correlation is observed.8 The findings imply that firms have to 
pledge collateral when raising long-term debt, whereas collateral requirements do 
not play an important factor when a firm is raising short-term debt.
In contrast to the expectations, leverage does not exhibit a negative correlation 
to earnings volatility (SDROA). This is found when total debt as well as long-
term debt is taken into account. The result may be due to the possible non-monot-
onic relation between leverage and earnings volatility that according to Morellec 
(2004) prevails if a manager–shareholder conflict is assumed. He argued that, for 
lower volatility levels, the manager is completely entrenched and the only effect 
of increased volatility is an increase in bankruptcy costs. This results in a nega-
tive relation between volatility and leverage. For higher levels of volatility, an in-
crease in volatility increases bankruptcy risk as well as the degree of managerial 
entrenchment. Something similar can be expected if another insiders–outsiders 
conflict is assumed.
Finally, we observe an ambiguous effect of firm size (SIZE), being positively 
correlated to leverage in some countries (France and Germany), and negatively 
correlated to leverage in other countries (Sweden and CEB). The results also 
provide a weak evidence of a positive correlation between leverage and firm 
growth (GS).
5.2. Debt maturity
As seen in Table 4, the results in general also confirm the hypothesis that em-
ployee-governed firms opt for debt of shorter maturity. By borrowing short-term, 
firms signal to uninformed lenders their quality and thus mitigate the adverse 
selection problem and the resulting credit rationing. Employee-governed firms 
resort to borrowing short-term because they are deprived of using other ways of 
signalling. Debt maturity is negatively correlated to employees’ entrenchment 
(DIFF) in Germany and the UK, but not in CEB. However, in contrast to the 
8  Testing the leverage regression model using total debt as the dependent variable for other coun-
tries reveals that tangibility of assets is positively correlated to total debt only in Germany.
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expectations, we observe a negative association between debt maturity and own-
ership concentration, and the effectiveness of monitoring (OWNCON). Based on 
the findings, it can be concluded that if shareholders use debt to control free cash 
flow problems, they more often use short-term than long-term debt.
Debt maturity is negatively correlated to profitability (ROA) and earnings vol-
atility (SDROA), and positively correlated to tangibility of assets (TANG), firm 
size (SIZE), and firm growth (GS). The results confirm the findings obtained 
when testing the leverage regression model that firms have to pledge collateral 
when raising long-term debt.
5.3. Cost of debt
The evidence suggests that employee-governed firms are generally not faced with 
a higher cost of debt.9 Moreover, in contrast to the expectations, the evidence im-
plies a negative impact of employees’ entrenchment (DIFF) on the cost of debt in 
some countries. The effect is statistically significant in France, Sweden, and part-
ly in the UK. Based on the results, it can be concluded that employee- governed 
firms in these countries are actually faced with lower cost of debt compared to 
the firms governed by other stakeholders. Again, mixed evidence is obtained 
for the impact of ownership concentration and the effectiveness of monitoring 
(OWNCON ).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Assuming an alternative corporate governance paradigm that puts employees in 
the firm’s governance structures as well as understanding their objective func-
tions, we investigate capital structure decisions in employee-governed firms. We 
took into account various factors that determine the ability of employees to affect 
firm’s decision-making process such as employees’ ownership rights, employees’ 
entrenchment, and the firm’s ownership concentration. We provide strong empiri-
cal evidence of employees’ conservatism in capital structure decisions. The re-
sults show that employee-governed firms operate with lower leverage compared 
to the firms governed by other stakeholders, and that employee-governed firms 
are less levered at the same amount of earnings volatility than firms governed 
by other stakeholders. In addition, we also found weak evidence that employee-
governed firms rely on internal resources to a larger extent. However , the results 
9  Results are not reported in the paper, but are available from the authors upon request.
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do not support the hypothesis that employee-governed firms have to pledge more 
collateral to obtain debt financing compared to the firms governed by other stake-
holders. Besides, we found evidence that employee-governed firms choose debt 
of shorter maturity. Not least, somewhat surprisingly, we found that employee-
governed firms in some countries are faced with lower (and not higher) cost of 
debt compared to the firms governed by other stakeholders.
We hypothesised that employees’ conservative capital structure choice stems 
from lower demand for debt as well as limited supply of debt. However, the re-
sults show that the capital structure choice in employee-governed firms is prima-
rily determined by lower demand for debt. The findings that allow us to argue that 
conservative capital structure choice in employee-governed firms is primarily de-
termined by demand side forces and only to a lesser extent by supply side forces 
are that employee-governed firms do not have to pledge more collateral when 
issuing debt and are not faced with higher cost of debt compared to the firms gov-
erned by other stakeholders. However, employee-governed firms avoid using debt 
because of their specific objective function and risk aversion. The results show 
that employee-governed firms are less levered at the same amount of earnings 
volatility than firms governed by other stakeholders, and that employee-governed 
firms, at least in some countries, to a larger extent rely on internal resources.
Empirically examining capital structure decisions in employee-governed firms, 
we provide strong empirical evidence of the capital structure implications under 
the assumption of an alternative corporate governance paradigm and contribute 
to the scarce literature available in this field. The main limitation of the empirical 
study relates to the inability of the proxy used to approximate employees’ en-
trenchment, which nonetheless proved that it can explain conservative financial 
behaviour, to better explain a time-invariant permanent component that is a pri-
mary determinant of a firm’s leverage and thus the larger portion of the variation 
in leverage. Other limitations refer to the abilities to draw strong conclusions 
about the effects of employees’ ownership rights as well as ownership concen-
tration, which results from using a database that is not the most appropriate for 
analysing ownership structures.
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